Introduction I. The Aim: Defining Whitehead's Categories of Existence Ontology is the study of being or beings. But what is being? Which are the beings? ...

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Subjectivity Space‐Time Valuation.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Ethics of Creativity: Beauty, Morality and Nature in a Processive CosmosJohn W. LangoBrian G. Henning The Ethics of Creativity: Beauty, Morality and Nature in a Processive Cosmos University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. 250 + xii pp.The aim of this interesting but flawed book by Brian Henning may be related through some remarks about the terms in its title.1 The term "creativity" stems from the most basic category (...) in Whitehead's metaphysics in Process and Reality, "The Category of the Ultimate." The term "processive cosmos" echoes the full title of Whitehead's magnum opus: Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. For Whitehead's metaphysics is both a philosophy of process and a philosophical cosmology. Thus, as the term "ethics" implies, Henning's book "presents a Whiteheadian ethic" (p. 8), an ethics grounded in Whitehead's metaphysics. This ethics is grounded particularly in Whitehead's axiology of aesthetic value (hence the term "beauty"), and it includes an environmental ethics (hence the linkage of the terms "morality" and "nature"). The inclusion of environmental ethics is central to the book's aim:If we are to have any hope of reversing the potentially catastrophic destruction and consumption of our natural environment, we must devise an ethical theory grounded in an axiology that acknowledges that every individual—from the most insignificant flicker of existence at the opposite end of the universe to complex individuals such as ourselves—has value not only for itself, but for others, and for the whole of reality.(p. 2)"The aim of this project, then, is," according to Henning's own summary, "to develop and defend a holistic, organic ethical theory grounded firmly in Whitehead's aesthetico-metaphysics of process" (p. 3).Indeed, Henning's project is worthwhile. Traditional ethical theory should be enlarged to include environmental ethics. Insofar as an ethics can be grounded on a metaphysics, it is important to explore how an ethics can be grounded on Whitehead's metaphysics. Since Whitehead's metaphysics is a philosophical cosmology, it is especially suitable as a grounding for an environmental ethics. Accordingly, in reading Henning's book, process philosophers should encounter many interesting ideas. [End Page 450]Nonetheless, the book has some significant flaws. First, there is a problem of audience. In addition to process philosophers, Henning wants his book to be accessible to philosophers who are not conversant with Whitehead's metaphysics, as the following passage evidences:Anyone seeking to develop a moral philosophy based on Whitehead's work faces many challenges. One obvious reason for the relative lack of attention given to Whitehead's work by mainstream environmental and moral philosophers is the density and abstruseness of the texts themselves. Coupled with the generally unfavorable view of metaphysical speculation among most contemporary ethicists, this has led many to admire Whitehead's work from afar. Given this, a secondary, though not unimportant, goal of this project is to show the value of Whitehead's complex process metaphysics for moral and environmental philosophy by presenting it in language that strives for clarity and seeks to do justice to the richness and nuances of his thought.(p. 8)Unfortunately, in the judgment of this reviewer, this secondary goal is not accomplished. The first chapter of Henning's book ("From Mechanism to Organism") contains an exposition of Whitehead's metaphysics (pp. 27–37). But this exposition is far too brief. Whitehead's technical terms are not explained sufficiently, and quotations from his writings are used too frequently. In subsequent chapters, an understanding of his metaphysics is presupposed. For example, the second chapter ("An Ecstatic Axiology") defends "an alternative to the classical interpretation of Whitehead's metaphysics" (p. 42), namely, "the ecstatic interpretation" (p. 51). (The classical interpretation is exemplified by Ivor Leclerc and William Christian, and the alternative interpretation by Jorge Nobo and Judith Jones.) Specialists in Whitehead should find this second chapter accessible, but nonspecialists are likely to find it unenlightening. Before attempting to read Henning's interesting book, I would encourage mainstream environmental and moral philosophers to study Whitehead's metaphysics from other sources.Acceptance of Henning's aim of developing an ethics grounded in Whitehead's metaphysics is impeded by "the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Ethics of Creativity: Beauty, Morality and Nature in a Processive CosmosJohn W. LangoBrian G. Henning The Ethics of Creativity: Beauty, Morality and Nature in a Processive Cosmos University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. 250 + xii pp.The aim of this interesting but flawed book by Brian Henning may be related through some remarks about the terms in its title.1 The term "creativity" stems from the most basic category (...) in Whitehead's metaphysics in Process and Reality, "The Category of the Ultimate." The term "processive cosmos" echoes the full title of Whitehead's magnum opus: Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. For Whitehead's metaphysics is both a philosophy of process and a philosophical cosmology. Thus, as the term "ethics" implies, Henning's book "presents a Whiteheadian ethic" (p. 8), an ethics grounded in Whitehead's metaphysics. This ethics is grounded particularly in Whitehead's axiology of aesthetic value (hence the term "beauty"), and it includes an environmental ethics (hence the linkage of the terms "morality" and "nature"). The inclusion of environmental ethics is central to the book's aim:If we are to have any hope of reversing the potentially catastrophic destruction and consumption of our natural environment, we must devise an ethical theory grounded in an axiology that acknowledges that every individual—from the most insignificant flicker of existence at the opposite end of the universe to complex individuals such as ourselves—has value not only for itself, but for others, and for the whole of reality.(p. 2)"The aim of this project, then, is," according to Henning's own summary, "to develop and defend a holistic, organic ethical theory grounded firmly in Whitehead's aesthetico-metaphysics of process" (p. 3).Indeed, Henning's project is worthwhile. Traditional ethical theory should be enlarged to include environmental ethics. Insofar as an ethics can be grounded on a metaphysics, it is important to explore how an ethics can be grounded on Whitehead's metaphysics. Since Whitehead's metaphysics is a philosophical cosmology, it is especially suitable as a grounding for an environmental ethics. Accordingly, in reading Henning's book, process philosophers should encounter many interesting ideas. [End Page 450]Nonetheless, the book has some significant flaws. First, there is a problem of audience. In addition to process philosophers, Henning wants his book to be accessible to philosophers who are not conversant with Whitehead's metaphysics, as the following passage evidences:Anyone seeking to develop a moral philosophy based on Whitehead's work faces many challenges. One obvious reason for the relative lack of attention given to Whitehead's work by mainstream environmental and moral philosophers is the density and abstruseness of the texts themselves. Coupled with the generally unfavorable view of metaphysical speculation among most contemporary ethicists, this has led many to admire Whitehead's work from afar. Given this, a secondary, though not unimportant, goal of this project is to show the value of Whitehead's complex process metaphysics for moral and environmental philosophy by presenting it in language that strives for clarity and seeks to do justice to the richness and nuances of his thought.(p. 8)Unfortunately, in the judgment of this reviewer, this secondary goal is not accomplished. The first chapter of Henning's book ("From Mechanism to Organism") contains an exposition of Whitehead's metaphysics (pp. 27–37). But this exposition is far too brief. Whitehead's technical terms are not explained sufficiently, and quotations from his writings are used too frequently. In subsequent chapters, an understanding of his metaphysics is presupposed. For example, the second chapter ("An Ecstatic Axiology") defends "an alternative to the classical interpretation of Whitehead's metaphysics" (p. 42), namely, "the ecstatic interpretation" (p. 51). (The classical interpretation is exemplified by Ivor Leclerc and William Christian, and the alternative interpretation by Jorge Nobo and Judith Jones.) Specialists in Whitehead should find this second chapter accessible, but nonspecialists are likely to find it unenlightening. Before attempting to read Henning's interesting book, I would encourage mainstream environmental and moral philosophers to study Whitehead's metaphysics from other sources.Acceptance of Henning's aim of developing an ethics grounded in Whitehead's metaphysics is impeded by "the... (shrink)

This volume constitutes the first collection of essays exploring the implications of process philosophy for social thought. Process philosophy is a product of the twentieth century, but its Platonic roots relate it to one of the prime initiators of Western philosophical thinking. Alfred North Whitehead originated the style of thinking that subsequently has been termed "process philosophy.".

Without question, Process Philosophy and Political Liberalism: Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne, is Daniel Dombrowski's most important and well-argued treatise to date within his growing, prolific literary corpus. Bringing his expertise on John Rawls's political thought to bear on the process thinking of A. N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, he explores commonalities of approach and ventures the interpretive hypothesis that Rawls is, at least broadly speaking, a process philosopher. He also argues that each of these philosophers appropriately shares the (...) appellation “political liberal” when that term is carefully defined. I find this strongly plausible. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment by Frederick C. BeiserJohn W. YoltonFrederick C. Beiser. The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. xi + 332. Cloth, $39.50.Beiser characterizes the methodology of his study as historical and philosophical: historical in placing texts in their own context and in uncovering the intentions (...) of their authors; philosophical in reconstructing and appraising arguments (ix). Both methods are necessary for good historical work. The second is often practiced without the first, to the detriment of philosophy and its history. “A philosopher who reconstructs arguments without the aid of history indulges in mere guesswork and anachronism, measuring the standards of philosophical relevance and importance by the concerns of his own age” (x). Equally, understanding the arguments and ideas of, e.g., seventeenth-century writers, “also involves testing their truth: seeing how they cohere with one another, what their consequences are, whether they follow from the evidence adduced for them, and if they reply to the objections made against them” (x). This splendid study of the role of reason in seventeenth-century religion, science, and philosophy is a fine example of careful textual-historical scholarship with rigorous philosophical analysis.The goal of his study is to tell “the story of how rationalism, in the very specific sense of the sovereignty of reason, arose in seventeenth-century England” (5). Starting with an introduction which discusses such topics as “The Paradox of the English Enlightenment,” “Rationalism in the English Church,” “The Enlightenment and the New Sciences,” Beiser proceeds to detailed presentations and discussions of “The Protestant Challenge” (Chap. 1); Richard Hookers’s defense of reason (Chap. 2); the views of the Great Tew Circle, e.g., Falkland, Chillingworth, Hammond, Hales (Chap. 3); the Cambridge Platonists (Chap. 4); the nature of Enthusiasm (Chap. 5); John Toland and Deism (Chap. 6); and ethical rationalism (Chap. 7).Many of the topics covered have been the subjects of other books and articles. What marks Beiser’s account is the freshness of his approach, the many new insights and suggestions about the tensions between the holders of traditional doctrines and newer challenges. Beiser’s writing is clear, and the issues are carefully presented and analyzed. One of the central themes is the mistake of equating “rationalism with the critique or rejection of religion” (15), of identifying enlightenment with secularization (14). The appeals to reason often emerge from within orthodox religion, whose defenders were trying to cope with their own internal tensions. “Once we consider the Cambridge Platonists’ early reaction to predestination, it becomes clear that it was not Hobbes but Calvin who first posed the danger of atheism for them. For it was Calvin’s theology, and not Hobbes’s materialism, that inspired the fear of God that [End Page 138] they regarded as the source of atheism. In the eyes of the Cambridge Platonists, Hobbes’s materialism was only a false remedy for that fear...” (147). A similar point is made later: “the foundations of a rational theology” in Whichcote “did not arise from any need to combat a creeping Hobbesianism. Rather, it grew up from the inner struggles and torments of the Protestant soul” (165).Equally significant is Beiser’s analysis of enthusiasm, the appeals to divine inspiration rather than to reason or evidence: “We should be aware of accepting the contemporary caricature of the enthusiasts, which portrayed them as zealous and ignorant anti–intellectuals with no cogent or coherent philosophical position of their own” (187). His analysis of the enthusiasts stresses the epistemological nature of their position, rather than the usual theological, ethical, or political dimensions (193). He insists that “enthusiasm is essentially a philosophical concept. Historically, it arose as a response to the problem of the sources and criteria of religious knowledge” (187). The search for criteria is a pervasive feature of Beiser’s study: Luther’s and Calvin’s efforts to draw the boundary between faith and reason (24); Richard Hooker’s failure to “provide an epistemological foundation for his theory of natural law” (67); the need for a criterion to distinguish genuine from false revelation... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment by Frederick C. BeiserJohn W. YoltonFrederick C. Beiser. The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. xi + 332. Cloth, $39.50.Beiser characterizes the methodology of his study as historical and philosophical: historical in placing texts in their own context and in uncovering the intentions (...) of their authors; philosophical in reconstructing and appraising arguments (ix). Both methods are necessary for good historical work. The second is often practiced without the first, to the detriment of philosophy and its history. “A philosopher who reconstructs arguments without the aid of history indulges in mere guesswork and anachronism, measuring the standards of philosophical relevance and importance by the concerns of his own age” (x). Equally, understanding the arguments and ideas of, e.g., seventeenth-century writers, “also involves testing their truth: seeing how they cohere with one another, what their consequences are, whether they follow from the evidence adduced for them, and if they reply to the objections made against them” (x). This splendid study of the role of reason in seventeenth-century religion, science, and philosophy is a fine example of careful textual-historical scholarship with rigorous philosophical analysis.The goal of his study is to tell “the story of how rationalism, in the very specific sense of the sovereignty of reason, arose in seventeenth-century England” (5). Starting with an introduction which discusses such topics as “The Paradox of the English Enlightenment,” “Rationalism in the English Church,” “The Enlightenment and the New Sciences,” Beiser proceeds to detailed presentations and discussions of “The Protestant Challenge” (Chap. 1); Richard Hookers’s defense of reason (Chap. 2); the views of the Great Tew Circle, e.g., Falkland, Chillingworth, Hammond, Hales (Chap. 3); the Cambridge Platonists (Chap. 4); the nature of Enthusiasm (Chap. 5); John Toland and Deism (Chap. 6); and ethical rationalism (Chap. 7).Many of the topics covered have been the subjects of other books and articles. What marks Beiser’s account is the freshness of his approach, the many new insights and suggestions about the tensions between the holders of traditional doctrines and newer challenges. Beiser’s writing is clear, and the issues are carefully presented and analyzed. One of the central themes is the mistake of equating “rationalism with the critique or rejection of religion” (15), of identifying enlightenment with secularization (14). The appeals to reason often emerge from within orthodox religion, whose defenders were trying to cope with their own internal tensions. “Once we consider the Cambridge Platonists’ early reaction to predestination, it becomes clear that it was not Hobbes but Calvin who first posed the danger of atheism for them. For it was Calvin’s theology, and not Hobbes’s materialism, that inspired the fear of God that [End Page 138] they regarded as the source of atheism. In the eyes of the Cambridge Platonists, Hobbes’s materialism was only a false remedy for that fear...” (147). A similar point is made later: “the foundations of a rational theology” in Whichcote “did not arise from any need to combat a creeping Hobbesianism. Rather, it grew up from the inner struggles and torments of the Protestant soul” (165).Equally significant is Beiser’s analysis of enthusiasm, the appeals to divine inspiration rather than to reason or evidence: “We should be aware of accepting the contemporary caricature of the enthusiasts, which portrayed them as zealous and ignorant anti–intellectuals with no cogent or coherent philosophical position of their own” (187). His analysis of the enthusiasts stresses the epistemological nature of their position, rather than the usual theological, ethical, or political dimensions (193). He insists that “enthusiasm is essentially a philosophical concept. Historically, it arose as a response to the problem of the sources and criteria of religious knowledge” (187). The search for criteria is a pervasive feature of Beiser’s study: Luther’s and Calvin’s efforts to draw the boundary between faith and reason (24); Richard Hooker’s failure to “provide an epistemological foundation for his theory of natural law” (67); the need for a criterion to distinguish genuine from false revelation... (shrink)

There are two main groups of essays in this volume. The first centres on Locke's theories of religion and their relation to contemporary scientific thought and the work of Descartes, Leibniz and Hume. The second group explores the relation between biology and physiology, and the science of man.

In this dissertation I offer a theory of intrinsic value based on contextualist principles drawn from the value theories of John Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead. The point of departure for the argument is the contextualist view that the qualitative patters representing in experience objects of states of affairs to which we attribute values provide necessary, but not sufficient, conditions to elicit particular valuations, and ground the evaluative judgments we make. The sufficient conditions for valuation include a broader (...) context of memories, beliefs, and peripheral qualia that combine in an integral experiential whole whose value is not reducible to that of its parts. It is first argued that value is, as G.E. Moore suggested, a simple, indefinable property. This property is emergent from experiential qualitative patterns in the sense that value is conditioned by the patterns, but is not itself a condition of them. An analysis of experiential qualitative pattern is then offered, which indicates how some parts of these patterns are focused on in evaluative judgment as crucial for the reproduction of particular values through practical action, whereas the influence of other parts is largely ignored, thus forming a relatively constant experiential context. Finally, a theory of evaluative judgment is offered based on contextualist principles. It is suggested that a contextualist theory can answer the challenge of value relativism by showing how evaluative judgment is 'position relative' rather than 'author relative'. That is, two subjects many come to different evaluative judgments on account of their differing positions or situations, while both may agree that the other's judgment is sound given his or her situation. (shrink)

My purpose in this essay is to provide a critical survey of arguments within recent analytic philosophy regarding the so-called “mind-body problem” with a particular view toward the relationship between these arguments and the philosophy of A.N. Whitehead (and Charles Hartshorne’s closely related views).1In course, I shall argue that Whitehead’s panexperientialist physicalism avoids paradoxes and difficulties of both materialist-physicalism and Cartesian dualismas advocated by a variety of analytic philosophers. However, and I believe that this point is not often (...) sufficiently recognized, analytic philosophy of mind is no monolith, and there are those who have found some form of panexperientialism to be attractive enough to merit serious consideration or even full-fledgedacceptance (David Chalmers, Thomas Nagel, Ralph Pred, William Seager, and Galen Strawson among them). A critical discussion of such thinkers should beincluded in any adequate survey of the relation between process panexperientialism and the analytic tradition. Moreover, the revisionary strain of the analyticaltradition which looks to natural science for its construction of worldviews (Broad, Russell, Bunge, Carnap, Quine, etc.) would move us in the direction of examining arguments concerning Whitehead’s view and contemporary empirical scientific considerations. (For a discussion of the basic nature of analytic philosophy and the descriptive and revisionary approaches contained within it, see my Process and Analysis, 5-9, 12-13, 57; and McHenry.) Here I shall argue that Whiteheadian panexperientialism very naturally accommodates important aspects of quantum theory, including the top-down causation involved in neuroplastic phenomena under a quantum mechanical interpretation of brain processes and in so-called Quantum Zeno Effect. The overall picture which emerges is that Whitehead’s position is (at the very least) a strongly plausible alternative in philosophy of mind.While I must confess that this essay can only represent the merest sketch—indeed an adequate treatment of the richly complex interpretive, comparative, and substantive philosophical issues here requires at the very least a monograph—I nonetheless hope to present a coherent and useful précis of major arguments and comparative conceptual relationships, especially for the reader who may not be readily familiar with this terrain. I thus hope that this essay will serve as a short expository and critical introduction to the interface between process and analytic philosophy of mind, and a presentation of the several theoretical advantages gained by listening to Whitehead’s theory as it connects with concerns of analytic philosophers.I shall proceed by first working though the main outlines of John Searle’s important and widely reaching “The Recent History of Materialism,” an essay which exposes critical flaws in a variety of materialist theories in ways which Whiteheadians should find especially fitting and congenial. I shall then examine defenses of dualism and the relation of Whitehead to such defenses, followed by a separate section on Chalmers, Nagel, and Pred. I will then consider a number ofimportant objections to process panexperientialism, including objections arising from the work of Jaegwon Kim and John Searle. I close with a discussion of thementioned empirical scientific arguments. (shrink)

Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 26 (2006) 213-216 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Reviewed byJohn Berthrong Boston University School of TheologyDialogues at One Inch Above the Ground: Reclamations of Belief in an Interreligious Age. By James W. Heisig. New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2003. 215 pp.Few scholars are better prepared than James W. Heisig to write about the current state of Buddhist-Christian dialogue, and few have written more insightfully about the historical, theological, (...) religious, and spiritual factors that have made Buddhist-Christian dialogue so intriguing for the last four decades. Heisig is the director of the Nanzan Institute, one of the premier institutions in the world dedicated to cultivating dialogue primarily between Christians and Buddhists, but also with people of other traditions and no religious belief at all.The title of the book is taken from the writings of the famous medieval poet Saigyō, who said that he tried to live at "one inch above the ground." Heisig follows Saigyō's advice by focusing many of his articles on themes such as health and ecology rather than abstruse metaphysical discussions of the intricacies of Buddhist and Christian doctrines, although, as one would expect, he shows a deft hand at explaining the philosophical and theological dimensions of living life at one inch above the ground.The opening two chapters on how we can collectively view the current ecological crisis demonstrate Heisig's sure hand at moving between profound meditations on current events and demonstrating how these problems can be even better understood in terms of spiritual and religious insights. Heisig argues that having two eyes, one Buddhist and one Christian, might just help us walk better on the ground, especially a ground that is being harmed on a daily basis by human disregard for the natural environment. His essay on the interpretation of the Buddhist principle of sufficiency is based on the injunction that we should learn to "consider how much is enough." The following essay demonstrates how hard-headed he can be with his call for us not to move from an uncaring contempt for nature to an equally ill-conceived sentimentalization of nature.There are so many insightful and clever features to the essays in the book that it is hard to pick out any one essay for special comment, but one of my favorites, high-lighting [End Page 213] Heisig's rhetorical powers, is "Six Sūtras on Dialogue" (pp. 139–157). This essay demonstrates what a Christian theologian might learn from engaging in interreligious dialogue. Moreover, it even takes the form, as Heisig explains, of the traditional Buddhist sūtra of six teachings on the nature of dialogue. Dialogue, according to Heisig (echoing Alfred North Whitehead), "is an adventure of ideas" (p. 141). The first teaching is "The spirit of interreligious dialogue need not be born of traditions in order to be reborn there" (p. 145). One of the strong points Heisig makes over and over again is that we now live with increasing self-awareness in a religiously pluralistic world. Actually, we always have, though various theological traditions have been adept at either ignoring or rejecting the notion that there could be anything positive about religious pluralism. At its worst, pluralism simply demonstrated the spiritual depravity and turbidity of humankind, and at best, it could simply be ignored as unworthy of serious comment. With the growing social, political, economic, military, and cultural interconnections of the modern world, no one can ignore pluralism. Theologians and religious leaders, in particular, need to think about religious pluralism even if this dialogue is not something that was "born" within their traditional theological discourse.The second teaching is a corroloary of the first: "Dialogue is primarily a minority enterprise that stands free of the obligations of institutional religion" (p. 147). Now, the leaders of institutional religion might dispute this point, but again Heisig is correct in noting that people are going to talk to their neighbors regardless of what they are told to do by worried religious authorities. He makes the... (shrink)

This book, a reevaluation of a major issue in modern philosophy, explores the controversy that grew out of John Locke's suggestion, in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), that God could give to matter the power of thought.

One of the central problems in the philosophy of psychology is an updated version of the old mind-body problem: how levels of theories in the behavioral and brain sciences relate to one another. Many contemporary philosophers of mind believe that cognitive-psychological theories are not reducible to neurological theories. However, this antireductionism has not spawned a revival of dualism. Instead, most nonreductive physicalists prefer the idea of a one-way dependence of the mental on the physical.In Psychoneural Reduction, John Bickle presents (...) a new type of reductionism, one that is stronger than one-way dependency yet sidesteps the arguments that sank classical reductionism. Although he makes some concessions to classical antireductionism, he argues for a relationship between psychology and neurobiology that shares some of the key aims, features, and consequences of classical reductionism. Parts of Bickle's "new wave" reductionism have emerged piecemeal over the past two decades; this is his first comprehensive statement and defense of it to appear. (shrink)